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ABSTRACT: The radicalization of far-right political groups is becoming an increasingly
dangerous problem in German politics. While Germany may be viewed as a fervent ally for liberal
thought in Europe, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is gaining substantial traction
in national politics. Interestingly, the AfD has grown disproportionately by region, drawing more
support from East Germany than West. The underpinnings of this trend hinge upon increased
asylum being granted to Muslim immigrants and the long-held disdane by the East for the West’s
economic successes. An understanding of the AfD’s popularity is integral to combating intolerance
and radicalization within Germany as well as the threat of its spread throughout Europe.

Introduction
The radicalization and political success of Germany’s far-right party, the Alternative for
Germany or AfD, could pose a threat to Germany’s role as the defender of a liberal and tolerant
Europe. The AfD’s negative attitudes towards immigration and Islam have fueled its most recent
political advancements in the national parliament — the party won 12.6% of the national vote in
the 2017 federal elections as well as making significant electoral gains in regional state
governments (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019). In the state elections in the fall of 2019, Thuringia,
Brandenburg and Saxony experienced large advances by the AfD — the party is currently the
second largest party in these state governments, representing dramatic increases in the AfD’s vote
share since the party’s establishment in 2013 (Chase and Goldenberg, 2019). It is also important
to note that the AfD has veered sharply to the right since 2013. While it was founded as a
conservative free-market protest party against the Greek bailout and the euro, it is now defined by
its nationalist, anti-immigrant stance with elements of right-wing populism, racism, and neoNazism (Bennhold and Eddy, 2019). The AfD’s support also varies significantly among
Germany’s states, as AfD support is much more prominent in the former East than in the former
West (Goerres et al, 2018). In the elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the AfD received
11% of the vote — better than its 2014 outcome but worse than the 2017 elections — and managed
to beat Angela Merkel’s center-right CDU to first place in two east German states. Currently, the
AfD still comprises the largest opposition party in the German government ahead of the 2021
federal election, with polls predicting the AfD to win about 10% of the vote.
This paper seeks to understand why the AfD has radicalized and grown in prominence in
recent years and, especially, why the regional differences in far-right support between the East and
West exist. I argue that the recent rise of the AfD is the result of the recent spike in Muslim
migrants seeking asylum in Germany and the fervent feelings of nationalism and xenophobia
which it sparked, notably in the East. Secondly, I will argue that the greater support for the AfD in
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the East is the result of long-existing feelings of disillusionment and resentment with the economic
successes of the West as well as the socio-cultural differences that prevail today as a result of
Germany’s divided history.
Germany is the symbolic leader of liberal democracy and tolerance in the E.U. and, as a
result, the radicalization of the far-right in Germany poses a risk to liberal democracy everywhere.
The analysis of the far-right also extends beyond Germany’s borders — in the last 10 years, we’ve
seen tremendous advancements made by populist radical-right leaders and parties all over the
world, and especially in Europe. The trend of such rising radical right anti-immigrant nationalist
parties poses a serious threat to the survival of liberal democracy. The fact that the radical far-right
is succeeding in Germany, a country with a history of Nazism that experienced the worst of what
the far-right is capable of, is shocking and alarming. This paper will initially seek to understand
why the far-right is radicalizing and succeeding in Germany and will focus on exploring the root
of the regional differences in the AfD’s electoral base.
I have structured this paper in various sections for the purpose of clarity and organization.
I will begin the paper with a literature review which will establish a scholarly foundation of what
has already been said regarding the rise of populist radical right parties and regarding explanations
for the regional split in AfD support. Next, I will present my hypotheses which provide the logic
behind my argument, and then introduce my argument which aims to synthesize different strands
of the academic literature. I argue that scholars have oversimplified the explanation for why the
AfD is more successful in the former East than in the West and that a combination of politicalcultural and social-economic factors as well as historical legacies have united in this specific
context to facilitate the stark regional divide. The research design section establishes how I intend
to go about gathering and analyzing the evidence I will use to answer the research question. Lastly,
I include my findings and analysis which confirms that a confluence of variables has enabled the
regional divide in support for the AfD to emerge.
Literature Review
What Sort of Party is the AfD?
The party was initially established in the context of the euro-crisis, and it stood for marketliberalism and Euroscepticism. The AfD advocated for the end of Germany’s participation with
the euro and for the reintroduction of the ‘Deutsche Mark’, Germany’s former currency. While the
AfD already had a nationalist element, it was restricted mainly to economics. Already in 2014,
internal disputes within the party led to the emergence of two factions: one Eurosceptic marketliberal faction and one national-conservative faction that focused on immigration (Goerres et al,
2018). As the refugee crisis began severely impacting Germany in 2015, the AfD shifted in the
radical-right direction in its adoption of an anti-immigrant, xenophobic and nationalist stance. One
common element however remained present throughout the entire party’s history: a distinctly
populist theme, either pitting the common people against an undemocratic elite or pitting German
nationals against immigrants and asylum seekers (Goerres et al, 2018).
This paper will use the description of a ‘populist radical right party’, or PRRP (Goerres et
al, 2018) – to describe the nature of the AfD. The PRRP class of political parties includes aspects
of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, as defined by Mudde (2007). Other far-right parties
in Europe include Hungary’s Fidesz led by Viktor Orban and France’s National Rally led by
Marine Le Pen. According to Mudde, nationalism strives to achieve a monocultural state, driven
by ideas of internal homogenization and external exclusiveness. Nativism, as a subtype of
nationalism, is an ideology that finds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of
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the native group, and that nonnative persons and ideas are fundamentally threatening to the
homogeneous nation-state. Authoritarianism is defined as the belief in a strictly ordered society in
which infringements of authority are severely punished; the third feature, populism, is understood
as an ideology that pits society into two groups: the pure people and the corrupt elite. Given
Mudde’s categorization of a party’s ideological stance, the AfD seems to fall well within the
PRRPs, and has been accepted as such by multiple political scholars in recent years.
Demand-Side & Contextual Factors in the AfD’s Recent Success
The demand-side explores the reasons behind electoral support: cultural, economic and
political factors as well as the changing political context that influences people to vote AfD. The
literature has mainly focused on the rise of the modern political radical right, but not so much on
the specific upsurge in support for the AfD or on the disparities between former Eastern and
Western Germany. A popular explanatory approach is the cultural backlash thesis: “People who
feel left behind or those who stand in conflict with more liberal views on topics such as family,
sexuality, or national identity mobilize as a form of cultural countermovement against liberal and
cosmopolitan value orientations” (Richter and Quent, 2019: 44). In the case of the AfD, supporters
tend to share some key cultural-political attitudes – namely their rejection of immigration and their
authoritarian, anti-democratic and chauvinistic attitudes (Richter and Quent, 2019: 44). In terms
of the historical East-West and its cultural-political implications today, Richter and Quent
examined how the East German disappointment after German reunification, which stemmed from
mass closures of East German businesses, high unemployment rates and the feeling of being
second-class citizens, helped conjure an “East German identity” which relied on depreciating the
‘other’ and those perceived as ‘weaker’ (2019: 46). Scholars have coined the term “East
Deprivation” to describe the perception of personal and collective discrimination felt in the former
East and have connected this perception of frustration and victimization to far-right extremist
support in former East Germany (Richter and Quent, 2019: 47).
Hansen and Olsen found that AfD voters in 2017 were driven solely by two factors: their
attitudes towards refugees and anti-establishment sentiments with democracy (2019). Between
2015 and 2018 Germany accepted an unprecedented 1.4 million, primarily Muslim, refugees from
the Middle East and Africa. This was by far the most of any country in Europe (Statista.com,
2018). Germany is a country with a large Christian population; thus, xenophobia and antiimmigrant sentiments began to grow in parts of the country, especially in the East. The result of
such a significant influx of migrants into a predominantly Christian country was the rise of
xenophobia, racism, and ethno-pluralism – the belief that unique national cultures can only be
preserved if they are kept separate - especially in the East (Goerres et al, 2018: 251). Such cultural
sentiments seem to be a major motivation in Germany’s support for the AfD.
The literature has also examined socioeconomic explanations for divergence in regional
support for the AfD. Such explanations are typically referred to as “losers of modernization”
theories: “real or feared economic deprivation leads to disappointment and anger, which manifests
itself in a turning away from established parties and towards the alleged solutions offered by
populist and extremist parties” (Richter and Quent, 2019: 43). Most scholars agree that economic
motivation exercises only a slight role in gauging support for the far-right since nationalist
ideology remains the primary motive of PRRPs. However, in the case of former East and West
Germany, where an economic gap stemming from the post-war divide remains to this day, the
economic factor is worth exploring. Economic disillusionment in the former East could be a
potential factor causing higher support for the AfD compared to the more economically successful
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former West. Goerres et al. find that economic motivations do indeed drive PRRP success —
laissez-faire policies aimed at less economic redistribution, lower taxation, reduced welfare
expenditure and welfare chauvinism are crucial elements of the typical PRRP platform (2018).
Goerres et al. additionally find that PRRP supporters are driven by three economic motivations:
welfare chauvinist attitudes, high criticism of programs they suspect to disproportionately benefit
immigrants, and support for social insurance programs believed to benefit the more ‘deserving’
rather than the poor and unemployed. When considering the former East and West, the East lags
behind the West on multiple fronts — the former East has a higher unemployment rate, less
disposable income, a lower per capita GDP, and a lower quality of living (PewResearch.org, 2019).
Since the AfD earns disproportionately higher support in the former East, the economic variable
is not to be discounted.
Another aspect of the scholarly literature regarding the rise of far-right radical parties is
the contact theory argument which argues that increased contact with members of diverse ethnic
groups will reduce prejudice and xenophobia as first-hand information about the out-group
becomes available (Goerres et al, 2018: 253). The fact that there are disproportionately fewer
migrants in the former East might correlate with what the contact theory would predict. Since the
East Germans have less contact with the immigrants, this theory predicts that they would hold
more xenophobic and racist attitudes.
Lastly, scholars have discussed the political history of Germany with regards to regional
support for previous far-right parties as an explanatory variable. Goerres et al. find a significant
correlation between current support for the AfD and the electoral base of Die Republikaner,
Germany’s radical-right party in the 1994 German Bundestag elections. Additionally, Richter and
Quent find that 360 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands or National Democratic Party of
Germany (NPD) elected officials are presently strongly rooted in Eastern communities. The NPD
is Germany’s far-right and ultranationalist party founded in 1964 as a successor to the German
Reich Party (2019: 44). Richter and Quent find that …
In such areas, where far-right extremist issues supported by the NPD have found resonance
in the social discourse for a long time, we may assume that processes of normalization and
relativization go hand in hand with lowered resistance to far-right extremist positions
within daily political discourse to a much greater degree (2019: 44).
Such results indicate that there may be specific local regions where extreme and radical-right
voting is more common and more socially acceptable, and that these regions have historically been
in the former East.
Supply-Side Factors in the AfD’s Recent Success
The characteristics and evolution of the AfD party presents another aspect in explaining
the rise of the far-right in Germany. Much of why the AfD has become successful in recent years
is because it began as a market-liberal Eurocentric party, not a radical-right extremist party based
on nationalist ideology, because given Germany’s history with right-wing extremism, no overtly
radical right party has entered the government since the end of the Second World War. As the
party evolved with the influx of immigrants in 2015, the AfD channeled feelings of resentment or
anger into a nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-immigrant platform. Betz and Johnson explore the
nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right — the far-right draws on feelings of
resentment, unfairness and injustice and channels it against mainstream politicians whom they
frame as the ‘self-serving corrupt political elite’ which pursues its own agenda without concern
for ordinary citizens (2004). Thus, the party created the issue of a ‘perceived’ ethnic threat to
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mobilize the electorate on a strong cause – that of restricting immigration in an effort to preserve
the ‘pure, national and traditional’ culture. Ultimately, the AfD’s strategic shift to the far right with
their anti-immigrant focus guaranteed the party the political support necessary to advance. The
party justifies its racist and nativist rhetoric by claiming that exclusion of non-native groups is
necessary to preserve the identity of the group, whose very ‘purity’ makes it sacred (Betz and
Johnson, 2006).
Another supply-side aspect that might explain the rise of the AfD is the fact that the
established parties were not satisfying the electorate on the key issue of immigration, providing a
perfect opening for the far-right. Chou et al. refer to this as the ‘collective action dilemma’ —
unless all established parties coordinate on proposing tougher immigration policies, the far right
will remain a potent electoral force since they provide the sole channel of true representation for
parts of the population (2018). Thus, support for the AfD remains stable and growing because
other established parties fail to meet the people’s preferences on their most prioritized issue:
immigration (Chou et al., 2018: 3). A key component of the AfD’s rhetoric is therefore antiestablishment, putting forth the argument that elites and political leadership have not been listening
to the ‘real’ German people (Betz & Johnson, 2006). The AfD was able to gain voters who
previously supported one of the five main established parties through the immigration issue.
Hansen and Olsen characterize the AfD as a ‘protest party’ for those dissatisfied with the current
state of politics in Germany, arguing that the success of the AfD might be a signal of the failure of
the established parties in Germany’s current political system. Arzheimer and Berning see German
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to temporarily suspend the Dublin Regulation to allow
hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers into Germany as the catalyst for the growth of the
populist radical right in Germany (2019). The resulting ideological shift of the AfD in 2015, which
framed migrants as a threat to German identity and success, induced German citizens to vote on
the basis of their attitudes on immigration.
Hypotheses
H1. Why would the AfD be radicalizing now? It seems that the political contextual changes in
the past few years have been paramount in shaping the electoral base of the AfD. The rapid influx
of refugees from the Middle East and Africa – foreigners, ethnically and religiously, to Germans
– seems to have sparked a xenophobic backlash. The AfD was able to shift its policy platform to
reflect the sentiments of parts of the German population with extreme anti-immigrant attitudes.
The AfD’s success is contingent upon feelings that the German national identity is being
threatened and that immigrants from countries like Syria and Afghanistan are the cause of this
threat because of the perceived danger associated with Muslim migrants. It is interesting that when
Turkish immigrants arrived in Germany in the 1970s, there was no extreme backlash in the form
of a nationalist anti-immigrant political party as there is today with the AfD’s explicit antiimmigrant agenda. The reason might be that Germany officially invited Turkish people to emigrate
to help with their labor crisis: thus, they were labeled “Gastarbeiter”, or ‘guest workers’, and
provided cheap labor for German benefit (Prevezanos, 2011). The Turkish migrants were not seen
as threatening since they were initially expected to stay only for a few years, and their place in
society was clearly subordinate to any German citizen. While opposition to Turkish immigrants
did gradually take hold in the 1970s and 80s, it never amounted to the formation of a strong farright anti-immigrant party.
Now, the situation is quite different. The migrants entering Germany are flocking in larger
numbers and are not providing cheap labor, but are becoming recipients of Germany’s generous
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social welfare system. In the eyes of the AfD and their supporters, the Muslim migrants are coming
to Germany in the hopes of benefitting economically and therefore do not positively contribute to
society. The large number of migrants from the Muslim world sparks more of a racist nationalistic
backlash today because of these various factors. Thus, I propose that the root of the radicalization
of the far-right party in Germany is the spike in Muslim immigration in 2015 which induced a
threat to German national identity and wellbeing.

H2.

The second question this paper will attempt to answer is why there is such a strong regional
discrepancy in support for the AfD between the former East and West of Germany. In the 2017
German Federal Election, the AfD received 20.5% of the vote in former Eastern Germany, while
in the former West, the AfD received 10.7% – about half (Hansen & Olson, 2019: 12). While many
factors might be contributing to the larger far-right sentiment in the East, I propose the hypothesis
that the regional discrepancies are due to the cultural and economic differences that prevail today
as a result of the post-war period in which Germany was divided. Eastern Germans remain more
culturally traditional and are thus more susceptible to xenophobic and nationalist sentiment, while
the West is more culturally progressive and modern as well as more economically advanced than
the East.
The logic here has to do with the continuing implications of the geographic and ideological
split of East and West Germany after World War II. After the war, the goal of West Germany was
to become a modern liberal democracy. Therefore, West German interests subjugated to the larger
interest of ensuring the success of a post-war Europe. East Germany, on the other hand, was led
by Soviet communists, cut off from the modern liberal world — nationalist sentiments were able
to flourish as emphasis was put only on the success of communism in East Germany. There was
little movement in or out of East Germany, thus ensuring the homogeneity of the East German
population. On the economic front, the East still lags behind the West considerably, fueling
feelings of resentment and frustration with both the West and the political establishment. In recent
years, this resentment has grown to target Muslim migrants who they claim are threatening their
economic and cultural livelihood. In an interview done by the New York Times, a retired
hairdresser in former East Germany who voted for the AfD said she was fed up with how had not
ensured her a good pension or enough teachers for schools but had somehow found money to
integrate migrants: “I can barely pay for basics, while the newcomers are given so much. That isn’t
right. It makes people really angry” (Bennhold and Eddy, 2019).
Therefore, nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric thrives much more in the East. The AfD
taps into such feelings of resentment and redirects them towards foreigners whom the AfD claims
are threats to Germans and the German national identity. The combination of the cultural and
economic disparities that exist between the East and West of Germany today help explain why the
AfD has disproportionately higher support in the East than in the West.
Argument
Part 1: Why did Germany’s far-right party radicalize in recent years, and what explains their
success?
The radicalization of the AfD in Germany stems from the spike in immigration from the
Arab world in 2015 and the evolving implications of the mass migration of Muslims into Germany.
Coinciding with the global right-wing populist wave – as seen in the United States, Great Britain
and France as well as many other countries – the rise in migration threatened German wellbeing
and national identity. The AfD shifted to become a more radical right-wing, nationalist,
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xenophobic party as the influx of Muslim migrants began in around 2015. As this is not such a
contested phenomenon, I plan to focus my research and discussion on the second part of the
argument.
Part 2: Why is the AfD so much more successful in the former East Germany than in the former
West?
While much of the scholarship has focused on separating politico-cultural and socioeconomic factors, I will argue that it is the confluence of all of these factors that have converged
in this particular time and context. Many political scientists have advantaged one unidimensional
explanation at the expense of others, and I believe that this is not the right approach because the
current specific context of Germany has allowed all of these factors to unite in a way that has
brought about the success of the AfD particularly in the former East. All dimensions overlap and
interact with one another. Nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric thrive much more in the East
because of cultural and economic differences that stem from the West-East divide which lasted
from 1945 until 1989. The legacy of separation stemming from the post-war time has resulted in
cultural and economic differences that prevail today, and these differences have allowed the AfD's
rhetoric to resound more in the East than in the West. In the former East, the AfD is able to tap
into feelings of resentment towards the West and towards the political establishment and redirect
such anger toward Muslim migrants and foreigners whom the AfD claim are threats to Germany
and to the German national identity.
The AfD is successfully using East Germans’ feelings of resentment and disillusionment
to form a nationalist coalition that stands against globalization and immigration. Some of the
factors I will explore are the legacy of communism and authoritarianism in the East today and how
this historical legacy has engendered stronger feelings of nationalism and xenophobia in the East.
Additionally, economic disparities that stem from the East-West divide have allowed the West to
economically succeed at higher rates and achieve higher levels of education. I intend to analyze
how the combination of the cultural and economic disparities that exist between the East and West
today as a result of Germany’s history of separation help explain why the AfD has
disproportionately higher support in the East than in the West.
Research Design
To test my two hypotheses, I use a two-part research design. The first part addresses the
question of why the AfD is radicalizing now. I will do a qualitative analysis to develop a thorough
explanation for why the AfD has become more successful in recent years. I identify a link between
increased immigration from Muslim countries and higher support for the AfD and therefore
propose that the spike in immigration caused a right-wing nationalist populist backlash because of
the perceived threat to German national identity the migrants caused. I will explain the correlation
between increased migration and increased support for the AfD through a qualitative analysis: why
did people begin harboring such extreme anti-immigrant feelings, and how did the AfD’s platform
evolve to explicitly adopt an anti-immigrant program? The qualitative nature of my research will
seek to determine what exactly the causal mechanism is behind increased immigration and higher
support for the AfD. I will analyze national and local news sources, the evolution of party
platforms, and already-existing interviews with both members and supporters of the AfD. The
mechanism I am trying to isolate is changing opinion toward immigration(essentially a measure
of changing xenophobic and nationalist sentiment) as well as the changing character and policy
platform of the AfD from a free-market party to an anti-immigrant right-wing populist party.
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The second part of the research design will address the regional split in support for the AfD
– in essence, why former East Germany has significantly higher support for the AfD than the
former West. I will determine what factors are motivating support for the AfD and look at
differences between West and East Germany as well as overall trends in the former West compared
to the East. In order to identify the mechanism for why political-cultural and social-economic
factors influence whether individuals hold anti-immigrant or radical right beliefs, I will do
qualitative analysis through analyzing news sources, available online interviews, and various AfD
official online platforms. This will reveal why former East Germans feel more inclined than former
West Germans to vote for the AfD. I expect to find higher perceptions of threat as a result of
Muslim migrants in the East, for which I will present evidence of political-cultural, socialeconomic and historical factors in influencing such anti-immigrant feelings. While the economic
factor might be prevalent, I foresee that the social-cultural and historical variables will be more
significant in influencing higher AfD support in the former East.
Through analyzing news sources, interviews and AfD online platforms, I draw the
connection between stronger negative feelings and racism towards Muslim migrants in the East
because of the threat they pose to East German economic advancement as well as the perceived
ethnic threat as a result of stronger feelings of racism in the East. I find evidence that resentment
towards the West already exists in the East, as I explore deeper through qualitative analysis of
local newspapers and existing online interviews. The qualitative analysis will reveal that the AfD
redirects already existing resentments in the East – economic, social and cultural – and frames the
migrants as dangerous intruders that will keep East Germans behind and threaten the traditional
German identity to which East Germans cling.
In an effort to get at the root of the AfD’s recent success and regional disparities within
Germany, I have considered multiple avenues to come up with qualitative data. First, I analyze
AfD online discourse in the form of Facebook and Twitter posts, AfD campaign posters, and
comments made by AfD party members and leaders found from interviews conducted by reputable
German news and media organizations. Second, I consider what AfD supporters are saying through
analyzing interviews conducted by news and media organizations. Third, I delve into Germany’s
divided history to provide insight into why West and East Germans still think and act so differently
after thirty years of reunification.
Findings & Analysis
I have structured this section in three categories. I begin with my findings about the AfD
as a party, analyzing the party’s public image and rhetoric, then move onto what is motivating AfD
supporters to vote for the party, and lastly consider how Germany’s divided history has affected
the regional split in far-right support. My findings reveal that the essence of the AfD as a party is
their vehement anti-Islam and anti-refugee stance, and that this resounds well with East Germans
because of their fear of ‘Islamization’ and of being left behind, culturally and economically which
stemsfrom the East’s unique historical legacy.
The AfD’s Public Image
The online social media content of the AfD centers around anti-immigration rhetoric.
Serrano et al. analyzed the AfD’s social media platforms to find that the AfD was limiting their
online content related to the economy while focusing on delivering provocative content related to
immigration topics (2019: 222). Serrano et al. analyzed 12,912 Facebook posts and 30,437,991
tweets, using topic modelling to compare the AfD’s official party platform manifesto with their
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social media content. Due to a of lack of time and data analysis capabilities, I rely on their data
and subsequent conclusions to support my analysis of the AfD’s social media discourse. While the
AfD’s actual manifesto discusses the economy in 21% of the documents and immigration in
19.2%, on Facebook the economy is mentioned 4.5% of the time and immigration 16.1% and
Twitter, posts regarding the economy make up 4.7% of the total while immigration make up 21.8%
(Serrano et al., 2019: 222). The AfD is utilizing the power of social media to spread its more
provocative anti-migration agenda, playing to those who hold xenophobic attitudes and who rely
on social media as their news source. In fact, multiple studies have confirmed the fact that AfD
supporters prefer to obtain information from social media platforms, stemming from their
disenchantment with already established communication channels (Serrano et al., 2019: 215).
Additionally, the AfD is the most active political party on Facebook with far more comments, likes
and shares than any other German political party (Serrano et al., 2019: 2018). The AfD appears to
be using social media as a direct means with which to get their more confrontational and
inflammatory anti-immigrant messages across to their pool of frustrated voters.
The AfD’s campaign posters carry an obvious and garish tone of anti-Islamist and antiMuslim rhetoric, suggesting that the Muslim religion does not belong in Germany. A simple
Google search allowed me to find a selection of Islamophobic slogans on AfD posters: “Stop
Islamization”, “Islam-Free Schools!”, “’New Germans?’ – We’ll do it ourselves.”, "End asylum
fraud! Vote AfD", and “’Burkas?’ We like bikinis.”. While the ‘Stop Islamization’ is an image of
three Muslim women wearing burkas, the rest of the posters mainly depict pretty, white and young
women. The rhetoric is clearly anti-Muslim – explicitly and negatively targeting an entire religious
group – insinuating that asylum-seekers from the Arab world have no place in Germany and,
contrary to Merkel’s open refugee policy, are not welcome.
Many AfD posters have been defaced, vandalized, or torn down. Therefore, campaign
posters are mainly hung at night to avoid the public eye, and high enough to be out of reach to
those without a ladder. Such an approach to campaigning reveals that the AfD are aware that their
rhetoric is incendiary and thus use tactics to prevent outright opposition and public confrontation.
Hanging the poster so high that it is out of reach allows the poster to exist in a higher dimension –
the people have no say or right to oppose what the poster is suggesting, and such a tactic might
even be accused as being undemocratic for this reason. The AfD’s decision to focus on such
imagery and derogatory slogans in their campaign posters reflects the kind of image they want to
disseminate to the German public, and by doing so, shifts the frame of acceptable public discourse
to the right.
AfD Party Member Rhetoric
In analyzing interviews with AfD party members and speeches given, it becomes clear that
some of their words and phrases are “confusingly similar to those used by the Nazis” (Hänel,
2020). Björn Höcke – the leader of the AfD’s far-right faction in Thuringia has been notoriously
designated as a fascist by the courts, partly because he wrote a book so extreme that AfD
lawmakers were not able to distinguish between Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and Höcke when
presented with excerpts which were all from Höcke’s book (Huetlin, 2020). Giving a speech in
Dresden in January 2017, Höcke referred to Germans as being the “only people in the world to
plant a monument of shame in the heart of its capital”, referring to the Memorial to the Murdered
Jews of Europe in Berlin, and went on to call for a “180 degree change” in their commemoration
policy (Taub and Fisher, 2017). Höcke’s inflammatory language does not end with belittling the
Holocaust — he also utilizes racial stereotypes, making comments such as “thousands of German
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youths experience school as a fearful place, because African thugs mob, terrorize and beat them
there” (Hänel, 2020). While Höcke represents the more extremist members of the AfD, it is
estimated that around 40% of AfD party members identify themselves with the Höcke-led
extremist wing. Additionally, the more radical far-right contingency dominates in the Eastern
states such as Thuringia while in the West, support is substantially lower and much more moderate
(Hänel, 2020).
AfD leaders have been known for their offensive remarks, inciting public response and
sparking debates around their racist, fascist and highly offensive rhetoric. Alexander Gauland, cochairman of the AfD, spoke about German national soccer team's defender Jerome Boateng, a
Ghanaian German – asserting that despite his skills on the field, people would not want “someone
like Boateng as a neighbor.” Gauland continued to say that “Germany should close its borders”
and, referring to an image showing a drowned refugee child, claimed “We can't be blackmailed by
children's eyes” (Hänel, 2020). In 2016, former co-chair of the AfD Frauke Petry condoned
shooting at refugees attempting to enter Germany illegally, marking herself as the first German
politician to condone shooting at the border since Communist East German leader Erich Honecker
(Hänel, 2020). Further incendiary remarks came from Andrew Wendt, member of Parliament in
the Eastern state of Saxony, who inquired into how far the state covers the cost of sterilizing
unaccompanied refugee minors (Hänel, 2020). Andre Poggenburg, head of the AfD in Saxony,
urged lawmakers in the state parliament to “get rid of, once and for all, this rank growth on the
German racial corpus” – using phrases clearly reminiscent of Nazi terminology (Hänel, 2020).
Lastly, Andreas Kalbitz, AfD chief of the Eastern state of Brandenburg, admitted to attending a
2007 rally in Greece at which a swastika flag was raised, releasing a statement in 2019 that claimed
he took part “out of curiosity” (Hänel, 2020). AfD leaders, especially those in power in the East,
have proven to be capable of truly remarkable horrid discourse. Most of these offensive comments
are extremely racist, ultranationalist and highly aggressive at their essence.
What motivates all of these comments, though, is a nostalgia for a white and traditional
Germany – a vision which is being threatened by western values of multiculturalism and
globalization and the political establishment’s failure to acknowledge the fears and the anger of
those in the East. Angela Merkel’s ‘Willkommenspolitik’, or ‘Welcome Politics’, that resulted in
the mass migration of around one million asylum-seekers from the Middle East in 2015 and 2016
is portrayed as the catalyst for the breakdown of German society and culture. Central to the AfD’s
narrative is that “the east is where Germany is still Germany and where men are still men”, evoking
a narrative reminiscent of “gallic villages in the eastern countryside” (Bennhold and Eddy, 2019).
The AfD thus promises to fight for the Germany that the East yearns for – giving them the attention
that was lacking from the mainstream political establishment.
Voting AfD in Protest
Having analyzed the supply-side, the AfD’s public image and rhetoric, I will now go on to
analyze the demand-side: how are AfD supporters receiving the AfD and what do they think about
the party? In interviews with AfD party supporters found on Der Spiegel TV, findings seem to
indicate that they view the party as a protest party. Der Spiegel TV reveals that many supporters
are not familiar with the party platform but claimed they would vote for the AfD anyway, as a
protest vote (Der Spiegel, 2016). Others referred to a time when they were ‘robbed by foreigners’
and conveyed that they understood the AfD to be a party for the older generation and those who
hold resentments (Der Spiegel, 2016). Another claims that he views the party as a real alternative
that has the capacity to deliver on promises of security and freedom (Der Spiegel, 2016). East
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Germans seem to vote for the AfD as a protest against the current establishment, Merkel’s open
refugee policy, the perceived lack of understanding and attention given to them, and the fact that
East Germans are being forced to accept asylum-seekers whom they view as intruding on and
threatening the traditional German way of life.
‘Der Spiegel TV’ also includes various images distributed by the AfD – all of which portray
Angela Merkel and refugees in a negative light. One image portrays Angela Merkel smiling in
front of a decimated bleak scene of a destroyed city, with the slogan “Terror, Bombs, Migration:
Mommy says, ‘You will make it!’” (Der Spiegel, 2016). An image disseminated by a young
offshoot of the AfD – the ‘Young Alternatives’ – shows a wooden box containing an ax and a
sledgehammer with the slogan, “Refugee-Starter kit” (Der Spiegel, 2016). In the interview, Young
Alternative member David Eckert, a 24-year old right-wing thinker, says that “it is clear that a
youth organization will be more provocative than the mother organization”, and when prompted
to speak about the “Refugee-Starter kit” image, he replied that it can of course be interpreted as
the fact that Germany is giving refugees the tools with which to start a new life in Germany. The
interviewer responds by saying that it also is a very obvious reference to refugee ax-terrorism, to
which Eckert remarks “but it is you that made that connection” (Der Spiegel, 2016). Eckert
continues to say that the Young Alternatives seek to get rid of German citizenship for the many
Turkish people living in Germany, claiming that there are problems with their loyalty to Germany,
that the term ‘Turkish guest worker’ is a myth, and that they should all leave and move back to
Turkey. Additionally, the youth organization’s platform contains the fact that Germany needs more
children – essentially that it isn’t the answer to accept people from outside of Germany to constitute
the new generation. Eckert finds that ‘Germany needs to move to the right’ and that he wants to
see ‘eventual assimilation’ (Der Spiegel, 2016). Weronika Zimnik, a 15-year old member of the
Young Alternatives, looks up to Björn Höcke – the leader of the AfD’s far-right faction – and says,
“We don’t want to have the refugees. We don’t want the Western values here in East Germany”
(Der Spiegel, 2016). Such findings indicate that the AfD focuses on portraying xenophobic
narratives aimed at Germans who feel frustrated with Merkel and her refugee policy and who are
nostalgic for and yearn for a culturally homogenous, traditional and white Germany.
Voting AfD Out of Fear and Resentment
AfD supporters also tend to be fearful about ‘Islamization and terrorism’ and saddened by
their perceived ‘erosion of traditional family values’ (Hill, 2017). A cheerful blonde woman in her
60s who supports the AfD interviewed by the BBC said: “The old people don't dare leave the house
after six o'clock … I live in such a beautiful place but when I open the door, the first thing I see is
headscarves and then I go to the tram and I see the groups of young men” (Hill, 2017). Such voters
are angry with Angela Merkel for having opened Germany’s doors to a million Muslim migrants,
which they perceive as threatening local populations and the German national identity. Another
interviewee voiced opinion: “The refugees come here but they don't plan to ever go back to their
countries when the war is over. All along they planned to stay and replace the local population.
More and more people are realizing that” (Hill, 2017). BBC journalist Jenny Hill finds that the
East Germans are disappointed and resentful about feeling left behind:
They’re saddened by what they see as the erosion of traditional family values. And they're
angry. Their fury is directed at the mainstream political parties which, they feel, don't care
about them. But the main force of their ire is directed at Angela Merkel and her decision
to open Germany's doors to a million migrants (Hill, 2017).
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What is clear after examining the AfD’s public discourse is that the main factor attracting
support is their utter insistence that Islam does not belong in Germany and that Merkel’s
welcoming refugee policy has threatened the wellbeing of the German nation and identity. There
are manifold reasons why people in the East sympathize with the AfD, but a key component is that
they feel ignored and left behind by the modernizing forces of the West which are making decisions
that they perceive to be harmful to Germany. What remains interesting is that far fewer asylumseekers arrive in the East; the majority of refugees actually reside in the West. This fact
substantiates the contact-theory argument mentioned in the literature review – namely that
increased contact with a certain outgroup softens opposition to that outgroup. With minimal
contact with asylum-seekers in the East, unsubstantiated myths and awful stereotypes flourish
much quicker, leading to much more ardent negative attitudes towards that outgroup. It is clear
that AfD supporters are attracted to the party because of its outright insistence that Islam does not
belong in Germany. The AfD prides itself on being the right party to challenge the mainstream
parties like the CDU and SPD which they perceive have led Germany astray.
A Divided History
Since the end of World War II, the East and West of Germany have had drastically different
histories — from 1945 until 1989, East Germany or the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was
under communist rule while West Germany was a federal republic – a democratic form of
government. While reunification occurred over thirty years ago and was a positive event in
Germany’s history, it had serious ramifications for the East, some of which are still being felt to
this day. On the economic front, East Germany has remained about 30% lower than West Germany
in regard to all important macroeconomic indicators since 1996 (Land, 2013:109). Additionally,
East German unemployment has recently been up to twice as high as in the West, hitting a high
point of more than 20% in 2005 (Land, 2013: 109). Further, in 2009, GDP per capita in the East
was almost a third below that in the West (Ibid: 109). Such a persevering economic divide may
have contributed to an increased sense of economic discontent, frustration with the West and of
being ‘left behind’ for East Germans in an increasingly global and multicultural world.
In addition to the economic aspect, the legacy of an authoritarian communist regime also
cannot be discounted in evaluating why the AfD’s radical platform is received more positively in
the East than the West. Up until the end, the East German Communist Party “saw ‘the people’ as
a homogeneous mass that shared the party’s views” (Bösch and Gieseke, 2018: 47). During this
time, East Germans lived in a homogenous society that prided itself on social equality and order.
Perhaps this history of racial and cultural homogeneity has engendered an ideal vision of a purely
white and traditional German society with ‘law and order’ that subconsciously influences how East
Germans perceive asylum-seekers from the Arab world seeking refuge in Germany. The West was
opened to the idea of democracy decades before the East, where ideas of cultural, societal and
political heterogeneity were allowed to flourish much earlier.
This article seeks to understand why the AfD is so much more successful in the East than
in the West. I argue that Germany’s split history has resulted in legacies that undeniably influence
how Germans perceive themselves today and how they perceive the recent rise in immigration.
While not only economically frustrated and resentful of the West, East Germans also have a
dramatically different history that has influenced who they are and how they think. The AfD has
managed to become a party that voices the concerns that matter most to East Germans in today’s
world: immigration, globalization and the corrupt political establishment run by ‘Western’ values.
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The majority of the AfD’s rhetoric is focused on refugees and asylum-seekers, clearly
playing on German xenophobic sentiments. However, the AfD utilizes the economic grievances
and frustration of those in the East who feel ‘left behind’ not only economically but also socially
and culturally. The AfD gives attention to such grievances and blames their current frustrations
and anger on the mainstream political establishment who have facilitated the arrival of Muslim
foreigners from the Middle East. Thus, the AfD’s rhetoric center on outright xenophobia while
using economic and cultural grievances to mobilize voters and to convince them that the recent
spike in Muslim migrants is the cause of their discontent.
Conclusion
I have argued that the existing literature has oversimplified the question of why the AfD is
more successful in the former East than in the West. Scholars often name one factor as the cause
of regional divides in political attitudes, but I have synthesized the various arguments to come up
with a more nuanced and holistic understanding of the complex issue of populist radical far-right
support. Through my analysis of the AfD as a party, of the attitudes of AfD supporters in the East,
and of Germany’s historical legacies, the paper has developed the argument that a combination of
political-cultural, social-economic and historical factors have united in this specific context to
facilitate the stark regional divide in AfD support.
This article adds to the existing literature on the radical far-right in a few ways. First, it is
an examination of the rise of the far-right in Germany specifically. Most existing scholarly
literature is focused on Western Europe or even the world more generally, but this research project
delves into explaining, specifically, the success of Germany’s far-right party, Alternative for
Germany, or the AfD. Additionally, while there has been literature dedicated to the rise of the farright in Germany, this paper hopes to shed light on the reasons for the strong regional divide in
support for the AfD in the former East and West of Germany, for which little literature currently
exists. This information might provide crucial information for those interested or involved in
German politics, as comprehending the reasons an electorate votes and thinks the way it does is
especially significant in the field of politics.
One limitation of this paper is that public sentiment and opinion regarding the AfD is
rapidly evolving, and the success of the AfD varies in every election and in every German state.
Thus, it is difficult to test a hypothesis about regional differences if the data changes when the next
election cycle occurs. An additional limitation is that it would have been extremely helpful to
actually talk to AfD voters in Germany to find out what’s truly behind their decision, both in the
West and the East. Since conducting interviews was not feasible for me, this presents a limitation
to the project. However, while the results might change slightly, I do not think they would discount
my central argument. The decades of resentment and discontent felt in the East would not
disappear, nor would their strongly felt attitudes of xenophobia and anti-Islamist fears that have
facilitated the AfD’s success.

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 4
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

103
13

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 4

Sophia Winograd
References
Arzheimer, K., & Berning, C. C. (2019). How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their
voters veered to the radical right, 2013–2017. Electoral Studies, 60, 102040.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004
Bennhold, K., & Eddy, M. (2019, October 26). 'Hitler or Höcke?' Germany's Far-Right Party
Radicalizes. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/world/europe/afdelection-east-germany-hoecke.html.
Betz, H.-G., & Johnson, C. (2004). Against the current stemming the tide: The nostalgic
ideology of the contemporary radical populist right. Journal of Political Ideologies, 9(3),
311–327. https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263546
Bösch, F., & Gieseke, J. (2018). Political Transformations in East and West. A History Shared
and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s, 45–101.
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvw04grr.
Chase, J., & Goldenberg, R. (2019, October 28). Things you need to know about the AfD.
Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-know-about-germanysfar-right-party/a-37208199.
Chou, W., Dancygier, R., Egami, N., & Jamal, A. (n.d.). The Illusion of Far-Right Partisan
Stability. 57.
Der Spiegel. (2016, August 19). Die jungen Rechten: Wie der Nachwuchs der AfD über
Deutschland denkt. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8NGWxTPLZ8.
Goerres, A., Spies, D. C., & Kumlin, S. (2018). The Electoral Supporter Base of the Alternative
for Germany. Swiss Political Science Review, 24(3), 246–269.
https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12306
Gramlich, J. (2019, November 6). East Germany has narrowed economic gap with West
Germany since fall of communism, but still lags. Retrieved from
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/06/east-germany-has-narrowedeconomic-gap-with-west-germany-since-fall-of-communism-but-still-lags/.
Hänel, L. (2020, February 7). AfD’s Björn Höcke: Firebrand of the German far right. Retrieved
from https://www.dw.com/en/afds-bj%C3%B6rn-h%C3%B6cke-firebrand-of-thegerman-far-right/a-52297134.
Hansen, M. A., & Olsen, J. (2019). Flesh of the Same Flesh: A Study of Voters for the
Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election. German Politics, 28(1), 1–
19. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1509312
Hill, J. (2017, September 26). Why so many voters in Germany’s east chose AfD. Retrieved
from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41398628.
Huetlin, J. (2020, February 18). Can German Activists Stop the Neo-Nazi Resurgence? Retrieved
from https://www.thedailybeast.com/can-german-activists-stop-the-neo-naziresurgence?ref=scroll. Land, R. (2013). East Germany 1989–2010: A Fragmented
Development. In United Germany: Debating Processes and Prospects, 104–118.
Berghahn Books.
McCarthy, N., & Richter, F. (2018, June 29). Infographic: Germany is home to the most
refugees. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/chart/14494/germany-is-home-to-themost-refugees/.
McCarthy, N., & Richter, F. (2019, September 2). Infographic: German State Elections: How
Brandenburg & Saxony Voted. Retrieved from
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 4
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/4

104
14

Winograd: The Radicalization of the Far-Right in Germany and Regional Disparities in Support
The Radicalization of the Far-Right in Germany and Regional Disparities in Support

https://www.statista.com/chart/19201/results-of-the-state-election-in-brandenburgsaxony-on-sept-01-2019/.
Mudde, C. (2007, August). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037.
Prevezanos, K. (2011, October 30). Turkish guest workers transformed German society.
Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-guest-workers-transformed-germansociety/a-15489210.
Richter, C., & Quent, M. (2019). Democracy Under Stress: Right-wing Success at the German
Parliamentary Elections: Socio-economic and Political-cultural Influences. Stifled
Progress – International Perspectives on Social Work and Social Policy in the Era of
Right-Wing Populism, 41–58. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfrxr60.6.
Serrano, J. C. M., Shahrezaye, M., Papakyriakopoulos, O., & Hegelich, S. (2019). The Rise of
Germany’s AfD: A Social Media Analysis. Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Social Media and Society - SMSociety ’19.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3328529.3328562.
Taub, A., & Fisher, M. (2017, January 18). Germany’s Extreme Right Challenges Guilt Over
Nazi Past. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/europe/germanyafd-alternative-bjorn-hocke.html.

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 4
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

105
15

